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Welcomed or not? 
Immigration as part of European history, 
has impacted widely on European 
societies and it will continue to do so. 
Immigrant employment patterns and 
entrepreneurship activities have 
developed rather quickly. Growing 
diaspora in EU member states has 
transformed international trade. Freedom 
of movement has helped Europe diversify 
itself culturally. Welfare systems have 
been extended to immigrant groups. The 
EU has evolved as a community of law 
supporting integration, through the 
development of new legislation dealing 
with discrimination, social exclusion, 
racism and xenophobia. 
The Swiss referendum last February that 
voted narrowly “against mass 
immigration”, proposing greater control 
on the migration of EU citizens into 
Switzerland through the introduction of 
quotas, has put the issue of immigration 
and freedom of movement back on the 
table. As the EU and its member states 
consider how to react to the Swiss 
referendum, this initiative has given 
opponents of immigration inside the 
Union a motive to claim that the result 
represents widespread feeling in Europe. 
The autumn 2013 Eurobarometer reveals 
that, although still below economic 
concerns, migration is a topic EU citizens 
think about more and more: there was a 
6 point increase since last spring, with 
16% of Europeans feeling that 
immigration is a key issue facing the EU 
today. 
The divergences of opinions and high 
sentiments the issue of migration raises, 
point to its complexity due both to the 
number of categories of non-citizens (EU 
citizens living in a member state other 
their own; non-EU nationals lawfully 
residing in the EU; third country nationals 
covered under association agreements; 
asylum seekers and refugees) and the 
nature of the policy (shared competences 
between the EU and its member states). 
Responding to demographic pressures 
The discussion on migration takes place 
as demographic trends become clearer. 
An ageing European population 
(estimates show that Europeans will have 
the highest average age globally in 2030) 
will have dire consequences on the 
working force. Member states with low 
fertility rates and large numbers of young 
people emigrating to find work will be 
particularly affected. Demographic 
pressures will only partially be 
compensated by recourse to women and 
the older generation that will increasingly 
enter the market. In parallel, migration 
patterns will change. For example, 
economic growth in certain regions may 
transform some countries that are 
currently sending immigrants (e.g. 
Turkey) into destination countries. 
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These demographic changes, the economic crisis, 
labour market shortages in high skilled sectors, 
and constant pressure to innovate have prompted 
governments around the world – including in 
Europe – to engage in a global competition for 
talent. The European Commission recently 
estimated that Europe would need 384,000 to 
700,000 workers in the information and 
communication technology sector by 2015, and 
one million healthcare professionals by 2020. But 
in the race for high skilled migrant workers, the 
EU is said to be lagging behind countries such as 
Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United 
States. To remedy this gap, the Commission has 
adopted the Scientific Visa and the Blue Card to 
attract top scientists and researchers to Europe 
and to expedite the entry of foreign professionals. 
Various factors influence the decision to move to 
European societies: access to the labour markets, 
low tax rates and breaks for foreign workers, 
processing time for applications, language, a 
welcoming environment in the host country, 
welfare state regimes and provisions, a 
standardised and clear process for the recognition 
of foreign qualifications, and family reunification 
rights. But the ‘migration frame’ seems to have 
contributed to the relative unattractiveness of EU 
talent migration. A 2013 study published by CEPS 
showed that legislation (e.g. on social security) 
that does not link together easily in the member 
states and can therefore be confusing, hinders 
understanding of immigrants’ rights. The variable 
opt-in/out attitude of certain member states on 
the implementation of EU legislation on 
migration provides a further layer of complexity. 
Reacting to fear 
The report on global social trends prepared by 
RAND Europe emphasises that European 
attitudes towards migration and the extent to 
which the EU is able to recover from the crisis 
will also contribute to its attractiveness as a 
destination for migrants. The Commission has 
launched a study on the ‘welcome culture’ to try 
and demonstrate that cities in Europe that are 
most welcoming to incomers from other regions 
(of Europe) are also the most vibrant, 
economically successful and pleasant to live in.  
European societies have indeed changed 
dramatically in the last decades and immigrants 
have obviously played a major role, especially in 
the transformation of European economies. 
Consumer patterns have changed due to the 
impact of immigrants. Immigrant small businesses 
and ethnic entrepreneuship are playing an 
increasing role. In recent years, an obvious impact 
of highly skilled immigrants has been notable. 
Social life and worldview formations have 
changed in Europe through immigration as well. 
What is unclear, however, is the distinction 
between the influence of immigration in 
European societies and that of globalisation. 
Arguably, the socio-political, economic and 
cultural transformation of Europe is as much the 
result of immigration as it is of globalisation. And 
cultural diversity and mobility are increasingly 
considered an important advantage for the 
competitiveness of a national economy in the 
context of globalisation, even if they can be seen 
as compromising labour market integration. 
At the same time, European societies are 
concerned with safeguarding local and national 
customs, their identity (national as well as 
European), which they sometimes feel is at risk. 
This is where the potential of populist parties in 
Europe rests, and can complicate the search for 
fruitful solutions and weaken social ties within 
and across national borders. This is also where the 
Swiss referendum can be a lesson: while right 
wing populist parties usually struggle to gain more 
votes in elections, they can set the national 
political agenda in ‘extraordinary times’ by 
capitalising on sentiments on a single issue. Let us 
not forget that the Swiss government was against 
this initiative; yet it failed to mobilise voters. 
It is important that efforts to address the realities 
of international mobility match the needs and 
priorities of all stakeholders. This requires a better 
use of existing tools (e.g. visa rules, mobility 
partnerships), but also implies reinforcing 
member state participation and implementation of 
EU policies. The financial crisis has opened a 
critical juncture in European cooperation and the 
forthcoming EP elections provide the necessary 
forum for a discussion on these critical issues – a 
window of opportunity that may not be available 
in ‘ordinary times’. This issue of the BEPA 
Monthly Brief hopes to give the impetus for this 
discussion on immigration, the opportunities it 
offers the EU, and the challenges ahead. 
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Swiss citizens voted on 9th February by a narrow 
majority of 50.3% in favour of a popular initiative 
entitled “against mass migration”. The Pyrrhic 
success in the proposal from the right wing Swiss 
People’s Party has led to countless reactions from 
the European Commission, political parties in 
several member states as well as the Swiss 
government. 
This vote motivates the need to discuss and 
analyse both the legal consequences of the 
referendum, as well as the reasons that have led 
Swiss citizens to vote against free movement of 
people between its country and the EU and the 
countries of the European Economic Area 
(Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). This debate 
has profound implications for the free movement 
of people in Europe, but must be clearly 
distinguished both legally and politically from 
similar ones taking place in other countries. 
Consequences for Switzerland 
First, and most obviously, Switzerland is not part 
of the EU. The main reason for the Swiss vote 
completely differs from debates which have been 
put forward in other parts of the EU. In a country 
where the unemployment rate among Swiss 
citizens stands at only 3.1%, the economy has not 
played a pivotal part in the success of the 
proposal. Rather, perceived overpopulation and 
the problems it seems to entail (e.g., 
transportation gridlock, housing shortages and 
booming prices) have played a central role. There 
has also been a clear divide between the vote in 
favour of the proposal in rural areas where 
migrant population is at its lowest, and the one 
against it in big cities, notably in Zurich or 
Geneva. 
Switzerland and the EU are associated by seven 
bilateral agreements in force since 2002. These 
agreements deal with various issues such as 
transport, agriculture, scientific cooperation and 
free movement of people. This last agreement 
contains the so-called “guillotine mechanism” by 
which renouncing to it automatically entails the 
termination of the other agreements. The 
initiative resulting from the referendum proposes 
to introduce a new article in the Constitution by 
which the maximum number of foreigners able to 
obtain a residence permit each year will be subject 
to quotas. Interestingly enough, this new article is 
vague in the sense of providing that the “annual 
ceilings and quotas for foreigners exercising a 
gainful activity will be determined in accordance 
with Switzerland’s global economic interests and 
in accordance with the principle of preferential 
treatment of nationals”. Thus, whereas the EU-
Swiss relationship will be severely affected as will 
the circa 1.1 million EU citizens residing in 
Switzerland (mostly qualified German and French 
nationals), it is far from clear how Switzerland will 
legislate on the initiative. 
Second, the Swiss government now has three 
years to renegotiate any international treaty 
contrary to this new constitutional provision. In 
the meantime, European citizens will continue to 
have the right to work and reside in Switzerland 
under the same conditions as nationals, although 
with an uncertain short-term future. The EU has 
strongly declared that Switzerland will not be 
entitled to an à la carte relationship. In other 
words, any restriction on the free movement of 
people will also affect the free movement of 
services and goods. The EU is Switzerland’s 
largest trading partner amounting for 57% of its 
exports in goods, and possible new obstacles on 
the access to the internal market are seen with 
concern by several Swiss companies. The Swiss 
electorate, however, was perfectly aware of the 
possible drawbacks in access to the internal 
market that a positive outcome would have 
entailed. It is possibly the reason why they had 
voted positively to free movement of people in 
the previous three referendums. 
Consequences for the EU 
It is necessary to discuss the possible implications 
for other European countries. Would it be 
possible to hold a similar referendum in any EU 
1 The Swiss referendum: Is free movement of  people in danger in 
Europe? 
By Diego Acosta Arcarazo* 
* Dr. Diego Acosta Arcarazo is Lecturer in European Union Law at the University of Bristol, UK.  
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member state? The answer from a legal point of 
view is clearly no. Any member state that would 
like to limit free movement of people would need 
to either leave the EU or attempt to renegotiate 
its membership, something which seems 
politically terribly complex, if not impossible. 
Hence, despite the satisfactory pronouncements 
by certain political parties in the EU as to the 
results in Switzerland, this case is not a possible 
model for other countries. 
Nevertheless, the Swiss referendum repositions 
the suitability of the free movement of people at 
the centre of the discussion. This has been 
recently largely debated in countries such as the 
UK, where several proposals have been presented 
(e.g., the possible cap to 75,000 residence permits 
per year for EU citizens). Leaving aside their 
illegality under EU law, notably the EU Treaties 
and Directive 2004/38, it is necessary to see how 
one may argue against these proposals and in 
favour of free movement of people in Europe. 
In the last few months, two arguments have been 
mentioned, notably by the European 
Commission. First, from the perspective of 
business, national companies selling goods or 
services in the internal market would suffer from 
any limitation of the free movement provisions. 
In turn, the economic argument acclaims the 
economic growth that countries which have 
received EU workers have benefited from. This 
last argument was present during the Swiss 
referendum and has been the subject of well-
known studies in EU member states such as the 
UK. One needs to be careful with comparing the 
two countries since the scope of the debates in 
either is distant from each other. In the case of 
Switzerland, the referendum would in principle 
affect all non-nationals regardless of their 
economic position. The debate in the UK has 
been more centred on the discussion about 
alleged welfare tourism, something which has, 
however, not been empirically proven in any case 
by the British authorities, as the Commission has 
pointed out on several occasions. 
The future of mobility 
There is yet a final argument in favour of free 
movement which has not been sufficiently voiced. 
It is worth remembering that contrary to popular 
belief and despite almost complete open borders 
in Europe, differences in salaries and 
unemployment rates, only a tiny percentage of 
EU nationals make use of their right to free 
movement: 97% of the 500 million EU citizens 
remain in their home country; only around 3% 
reside in another EU member state. Crucially, this 
movement goes in various directions and not only 
from poorer to richer countries. Indeed, the 
453,000 Swiss citizens residing in the 28 member 
states will probably be severely affected by the 
recent referendum. But how would this play out 
in some member states that have been recently 
critical of free movement such as the UK? 
According to recent government statistics, 
whereas 2.3 million EU nationals reside in the 
UK, the number of British nationals in the other 
26 member states (statistics did not include 
Croatia) reach 2.2 million. This last argument, 
which we may labelled as the human argument in 
favour of mobility, needs to be put at the centre 
of any serious debate in Europe on the matter. 
The question to put to political parties arguing in 
favour of restricting free movement of people is 
not only how they will cope with the negative 
economic consequences that any restriction will 
entail, but also what future they offer to their 
countrymen residing in the EU. Crucially, as has 
been argued, the populist right in Switzerland will 
now have to move from the comfortable position 
of rhetorically arguing against free movement and 
migration to a fully-fledged redesign which must 
achieve the impossible task of ensuring that  
current levels of prosperity are sustainable, while 
at the same time reducing the number of migrants 
although they have been instrumental in this feat. 
Indeed, for those defending mobility of citizens in 
Europe, the Swiss referendum may not be such 
bad news after all.  
The problem is now in the hands of the Swiss and 
EU legislatures that will have to determine their 
positions and long-term responses to the 
referendum. The Swiss government, who had – 
let’s not forget it – opposed the referendum, will 
now face the challenge to find a satisfactory 
solution in its negotiations with the EU. The 
current and new Commission will also need to 
deal with a far from ideal situation that will 
influence future debates in Europe. 
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Europe faces two challenges. On the one hand, 
unemployment in some parts of Europe, namely 
in the southern and south-eastern member states 
of the European Union, has reached 
unprecedented levels. On the other hand, a 
shortage of skilled labour in a growing number of 
regions and industries is also apparent. At the 
same time, demographic forecasts clearly 
demonstrate that this shortage will further 
increase. The impact of the demographic trend on 
Europe is particularly concerning. The reason is 
that Europe’s ‘native’ workforce is ageing and the 
number of graduates from all levels of education 
is declining and will continue to decline in the 
coming decades. 
In the short term: Facilitate EU labour 
mobility 
The remedies to the migration challenge are 
obvious. In the short term, Europe needs more 
mobility of labour between EU member states  
– in particular between those with high levels of 
unemployment and those suffering from labour 
market shortages. Today, less than 1% of all 
economically active EU citizens move from one 
member state to another annually. This clearly 
shows that there is not yet a functioning single 
EU labour market.  
The reasons for the absence of a single labour 
market are multifold. First, some European 
citizens who might find work in another EU 
member state lack the necessary linguistic 
competences. Others do not expect a speedy 
recognition of their acquired skills and therefore 
fear that the job offers they will receive will be 
below their skills level, which could lead to their 
de-qualification and to lower pay. Yet another 
reason is the fact that job seekers do not know 
how to start an EU-wide job search. Thirdly, 
there are structural barriers to mobility among the 
different EU member states. In some cases 
dealing with different social security systems is 
encouraging mobility, while in other cases 
mobility is not facilitated since social and 
employer benefits are not fully portable across all 
28 EU member states.  
Furthermore, in most EU countries various 
professional groups are successful at maintaining 
entry barriers that favour ‘insiders’. The outcome 
is obvious. Even if skilled EU citizens would 
show more interest in moving to another country, 
they could not easily become lawyers, teachers, 
civil servants, or establish a profitable business in 
the country of destination of their choice. 
Increasing home ownership also reduces the 
willingness and ability of EU citizens to move to 
another member state. This phenomenon is 
particularly true in crisis-hit regions and countries. 
The decreasing real estate prices in these areas 
tend to ‘lock in’ people who would otherwise be 
mobile. 
In the long term: Facilitate high skilled 
migration 
In the long run, even a higher degree of intra-
European mobility would not be sufficient to 
close future gaps in European labour markets. As 
a result, European countries with ageing societies 
and stagnating or declining working age 
populations that lead to labour market shortages, 
will have to rely on immigrants. A number of EU 
member states accustomed to finding the kind of 
labour and skills they require easily, will need to 
think more strategically about how to attract 
qualified workers.  
This challenge will not become easier over time. 
For demographic reasons in a not too distant 
future, many more economies – in particular China 
– will be in need of migrant labour. This means 
that the geography and composition of 
international migration is changing, as more 
countries will enter the global race for talent and 
skills. In the context of this emerging competition, 
the EU and its member states will have to develop 
smarter recruitment policies and improve their 
image as a destination for skilled migrants.  
2  Europe’s migration challenge and its economic impact 
By Rainer Münz* 
* Rainer Münz is a Non-Resident Fellow at Bruegel, in Brussels, and at the Migration Policy Institute, in Washington, DC. His 
most recent publication “The global race for talent: Europe’s migration challenge” can be found at Bruegel’s web site: http://
www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/819-the-global-race-for-talent-europes-migration-challenge/ 
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While most sending countries have adopted 
liberal migration policies facilitating travel and 
emigration, receiving countries in Europe see 
migration control as a key element of their 
sovereignty. As a result, EU member states 
generally have ‘unilateral’ admission policies that 
are neither aligned with other receiving countries 
nor with key sending countries. Given this 
situation, bilateral agreements or mobility 
partnerships can only play a minor role in most 
EU migration policymaking. 
Tackling the constraints on migration 
This lack of cooperation between migrant sending 
and receiving countries increases the costs of 
migration and decreases the positive effects on 
socio-economic development. The direct (and 
sometimes excessive) costs include the issuing of 
visas and passports, the administrative fees for 
recruitment and travel agencies, the commissions 
on currency exchange, the fees on money transfer, 
and other levies. These indirect costs are a form 
of labour market discrimination: they lead to 
lower incomes compared to those of native 
workers with similar skills; to reduced ability to 
transfer acquired social rights and benefits across 
countries, which translates into lower or no 
pension payments; to lower health insurance 
coverage; and to reduced or no access to 
unemployment benefits.  
Smarter policies could help reduce these costs and 
downsides of international migration. More 
cooperation at all points of the migration 
trajectory (in sending, transit and receiving 
countries) would offer policymakers the 
opportunity to craft policies that can be mutually 
beneficial and help mitigate the risks of migration.  
One driver of restrictive migration policies is 
public opinion. Many Europeans are not ready to 
accept more international migrants in their 
respective countries. In parallel, political parties 
with a restrictive agenda on migration are 
becoming more popular. In such a context, the 
outcome of a recent referendum in Switzerland is 
telling. The Swiss electorate has voted in favour of 
abolishing the freedom of movement between the 
EU and Switzerland. The objective is now to 
replace it by a government administered quota 
system. Opinion polls carried out by Maurice de 
Hond and Ifop seem to suggest a similar outlook: 
if asked in a popular referendum, citizens from a 
number of EU member states may have also 
voted in favour of restricting labour market access 
for workers coming from other European 
countries.  
Unfavourable perceptions of migration create at 
least three challenges for the EU and its member 
states. First, they point to the need to organise 
political majorities in favour of more pro-active 
migration policies. Second, they emphasise the 
importance of making Europe more attractive for 
mobile people with talent and skills. Third, they 
encourage the move away from unilateral 
migration policies and toward negotiated win-win 
solutions aiming at reducing the costs of and 
enhancing the welfare gains from migration and 
remittances. 
We should, however, keep in mind that more 
international migration from third countries and a 
greater degree of mobility between EU member 
states remains only one possible answer to future 
mismatches between the supply and the demand 
of labour and skills. EU member states with 
ageing populations must also consider other 
policies to protect the capabilities of their 
workforces. These should include increasing the 
retirement age and the participation of women in 
the labour force. 
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Monnet’s Brandy and Europe’s Fate 
“I have always believed that Europe will be 
established through crisis, and that the outcome 
will be the sum of the outcomes of those crises”. 
The influence of the historical figure of Jean 
Monnet remains substantial. Confronted with 
the eurozone crisis, European capitals have 
taken measures that will allow Monnet’s vision 
of a united Europe to survive. The author first 
presents Monnet’s role in establishing an 
effective ECSC with a High Authority, and then 
analyses his fragile legacy: the EP and the EC 
were steps taken toward a federal democratic 
state but were contradicted by nation states 
determined to preserve sovereignty. To 
conclude, he considers that the way toward a 
United States of Europe may be back on track: 
the eurozone will keep on deepening integration 
and become, step by step, more like the USA. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2014/
monnets-brandy-and-europes-fate 
Heading Towards a European Federation: 
Europe’s last chance 
During the crisis period, Europe has confronted 
two emergencies: the need for European growth 
and for ways to match the euro with a political 
structure. The creation of a European Federation 
could create a new dynamic. The authors 
propose a method for building the Europe of the 
future: a blueprint for an international treaty 
comprising ten articles and establishing a 
Federation of initially 6-7 countries, including 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and possibly Poland. The 
Federation is presented as the only way to revive 
growth, capable of fostering a new industrial 
dynamic through investment and cuts to the 
welfare state. France and Germany must change 
their outlook; political and economic cohesion 
(including finance, energy and defence issues) 
must be strengthened in Europe; and taxation 
must be harmonised. 
h t t p : / / w w w . n o t r e - e u r o p e . e u / m e d i a /
towardseuropeanfederation-godinoverdier-ne-jdi-feb14.pdf?
pdf=ok 
In Sickness and in Health: Protecting and 
supporting public investment in Europe 
During the crisis, public investment has declined 
in Europe and the EU fiscal framework 
provisions in this field are very weak. On the 
contrary, public investment in the USA, Japan and 
Canada has increased. The negative effect of cuts 
is particularly problematic for countries 
confronted with recession and could undermine 
long-term growth potential or aggravate 
unemployment in Europe. The authors propose 
to amend the EU fiscal framework to protect 
public investment in recession times, with an 
appropriate asymmetric golden rule: a fiscal rule 
that excludes capital expenditure from the 
computation of budget deficit requirements. 
Equally, they advocate for implementing a 
massive European investment programme in bad 
times. They consider that the European 
Investment Bank’s internal procedures should be 




Who Leads the New EMU? Implications of 
the economic crisis for the EU’s institutions 
The paper analyses the long-term implications that 
the choices made on the development of the EMU 
will have on the institutional set up. Crisis 
management has  s t reng thened  the 
intergovernmental structures of the EU political 
system at the expense of the communitarian 
decision-making process. Nevertheless, the 
situation has changed: the European Commission 
and ECB mandates have been broadened. The EP 
has been in a key position in the construction of 
the new economic/budgetary surveillance. The 
author considers that this reflects the reinforcement 
of the division of competences in the field of EU 
economic/fiscal policies. This fragmentation is 
dangerous for the EU democratic system since it 
disrupts the division of powers between the EU 
and member states and thus complicates 
democratic scrutiny of economic and fiscal policies. 
h t t p : / / w w w . f i i a . f i / e n / p u b l i c a t i o n / 3 9 7 /
who_leads_the_new_emu/ 
3 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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Ten Years On: Rebooting the EU-China 
strategic partnership 
China and the EU should strengthen 
discussions on global governance and focus 
their relation on pragmatic cooperation. The 
report concludes that the relationship between 
these two regions should move from 
discussions on trade to include climate change, 
urbanisation and security. On trade relations, 
wider-ranging links (e.g., on solar panels) could 
l e s sen  mi sunde r s tand ing .  A l though 
consultations are positive on global issues, 
security cooperation is poor and Europeans 
remain sceptical about China’s international 
role, which focuses on a limited strategic agenda 
and regional politics. The recommendations 
listed include: cooperate on areas important to 
China’s future growth (e.g., synergies on energy 
and climate issues); encourage contacts and 
exchanges between cities, ports and universities; 
promote the study of Mandarin; ensure that 
trade disputes do not envenom overall relations; 
actively pursue the negotiation of an agreement 
on investments. 
ht tp://www. friendsofeurope .o rg/Por tal s/13/
D o c u m e n t s / R e p o r t s / 2 0 1 4 /
FoE_Report_RT_CHINA_web.pdf 
The Geopolitics of Shale Gas 
The study analyses the geopolitical impact of 
the US shale gas production on the EU and the 
impact of this US shale gas revolution on oil 
and gas prices. It concludes that the 
development of US shale gas may have 
destabilising effects on oil and gas exporters in 
the European neighbourhood, which may in 
turn negatively impact on intrastate stability. 
Even if shale gas is an American phenomenon, 
it could make natural gas prices in European 
markets drop and put a stress on the traditional 
construction in European and Asian markets. 
Algeria and Russia could be highly exposed to 
oil price fluctuations. The decreased US energy 
dependency on Middle Eastern resources could 
increase Chinese and Indian competition in this 





The EU, Russia and a Less Common 
Neighbourhood 
The Vilnius Summit has highlighted the need to 
further focus on the Eastern Partnership, which 
is currently in crisis, and critically assess the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and  
EU-Russia relations. The author analyses the 
commonalities and distinctions in the 
approaches taken by the main stakeholders 
(EU, eastern partners and Russia). Russia 
adopts a hegemonic approach to its 
neighbourhood. In response, the EU should 
increase its resources to foster communication 
with societies in partner countries, abandon the 
question of the Association agreement with 
Ukraine, and focus on smaller measures (e.g., 
the introduction of visa freedom for short-term 
travel as a positive signal to Ukrainians). This 
approach should be linked to a modified 
European policy towards Russia that takes 
account of unresolved conflicts in the region 
and is more transparent on ENP objectives. 
http://www.swp-berlin .o rg/f i l eadmin/contents/
products/comments/2014C03_stw.pdf 
 
European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014 
The ECFR scorecard provides an annual 
evaluation of the member states’ performance 
in foreign policy. Conclusions are mitigated: on 
the one hand, 2013 was a good year compared 
to the previous one, with improvement on 
relations with Wider Europe, China and the 
Middle East. On the other hand, Europe has 
performed worse on multilateral issues, crisis 
management and relations with Russia. Iran and 
Kosovo remain clear successes, but a long-term 
comprehensive solution must be negotiated. 
The EU has faced serious challenges in the 
eastern and southern neighbourhoods: Russia 
competed with the EU in the post-Soviet area 
and the ENP’s irrelevance has become clear, 
especially in Egypt and Syria. The EU’s soft 
power in the neighbourhood is increasingly 
contested. The TTIP could be the EU’s next 
big success, even if distrust on data protection 
remains problematic. 
h t t p : / / e c f r . e u / p a g e / - /
ECFR94_SCORECARD_2014.pdf 
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Départs 
Philippe Legrain, conseiller principal et chef de 
l’équipe Analyse du BEPA, quitte la Commission 
et crée à Londres un think tank qui analysera les 
tendances en économie politique. Nous lui 
souhaitons une bonne continuation. 
Activités 
La première réunion du groupe d’experts en 
prospective de la Commission européenne – une 
initiative du Président avec le concours de 
l’équipe de la Conseillère Scientifique en chef et 
du BEPA – s’est tenue le 17 février. Les 
20 directions générales impliquées ont défini le 
programme de travail du groupe pour la 
première moitié de 2014 : des fiches 
technologiques seront élaborées d’ici mi-mars et 
serviront de base pour des ateliers de travail qui 
auront lieu le 27-28 mars et 1-2 avril prochains. 
Le groupe participera aussi à l’élaboration d’un 
Eurobaromètre sur la prospective qui sera réalisé 
en juin. Le résultat de ces ateliers et de 
l’Eurobaromètre seront utilisés par le conseil 
scientifique et technique du Président pour leur 
rapport qui doit être rendu en juillet. 
La conférence annuelle ESPAS « Global Trends 
2030: Key Challenges ahead for the European 
Union » s’est déroulée ces 17 et 18 février à 
Bruxelles. Des experts venant d’Europe, de 
Russie, des Etats-Unis, de Chine, d’Inde, 
d’Amérique du Sud et d’Afrique se sont 
intéressés à des problématiques telles que le futur 
de l’économie européenne, la réplique de 
l’Europe à la pénurie de ressources 
et le rôle de l’Europe dans un 
monde  de  p lu s  en  p lu s 
polycentrique. Le Président 
Barroso est intervenu dans les 
débats lors d’une conversation avec 
le journaliste John Peet, de 
l’hebdomadaire The Economist. Un 
rapport de l’Union Européenne sur 
les tendances mondiales et leur 
impact sur l’Europe est prévu pour 
mi-2014. 
Le 18 et 19 février, le Groupe Européen 
d’Ethique des Sciences et des Nouvelles 
Technologies s’est réuni afin de poursuivre 
l’élaboration de son Opinion sur les 
Technologies de Sécurité et de Surveillance. 
Activités à venir 
Le 1er mars, la troisième et dernière assemblée 
générale des « Formes d’imagination et de pensée 
pour l’Europe » se déroulera à Berlin. À cette 
occasion, le comité culturel, composé de 
personnalités du monde artistique et culturel, 
présentera sa déclaration finale concernant le 
« Nouveau récit pour l’Europe » au président 
Barroso, en présence de la chancelière allemande 
Angela Merkel. L’événement sera suivi de 
représentations artistiques illustrant le lien entre 
le monde culturel et le projet européen.   
Le 4 mars, le Président Barroso se verra remettre 
la médaille commémorative du centenaire de la 
naissance de Raoul Wallenberg, l’homme 
d’affaires et diplomate suédois qui a contribué 
par son action à sauver la vie de plusieurs 
dizaines de milliers de juifs de Hongrie pendant 
la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cette médaille, 
frappée en 2012 par la Fondation internationale 
Raoul Wallenberg, vise à honorer ceux qui, par 
leur action personnelle et/ou par leur rôle 
officiel, prolongent l’esprit de Raoul Wallenberg, 
en faisant preuve d’esprit de solidarité et de 
courage civique, en instituant les valeurs morales 
comme principe de leur action et en promouvant 
les droits de l’Homme. 
4 BEPA News 
Le Président Barroso lors de la conférence 
ESPAS le 18 février 2014. 
